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Abstract
Background. Since Whitten and Tygar’s seminal study
of PGP 5.0 in 1999, there have been continuing efforts to
produce email encryption tools for adoption by a wider
user base, where these efforts vary in how well they con-
sider the usability and utility needs of prospective users.
Aim. We conducted a study aiming to assess the user
experience of two open-source encryption software tools
– Enigmail and Mailvelope.
Method. We carried out a three-part user study (instal-
lation, home use, and debrief) with two groups of users
using either Enigmail or Mailvelope. Users had access
to help during installation (installation guide and exper-
imenter with domain-specific knowledge), and were set
a primary task of organising a mock flash mob using en-
crypted emails in the course of a week.
Results. Participants struggled to install the tools – they
would not have been able to complete installation with-
out help. Even with help, setup time was around 40 min-
utes. Participants using Mailvelope failed to encrypt their
initial emails due to usability problems. Participants said
they were unlikely to continue using the tools after the
study, indicating that their creators must also consider
utility.
Conclusions. Through our mixed study approach, we
conclude that Mailvelope and Enigmail had too many
software quality and usability issues to be adopted by
mainstream users. Methodologically, the study made us
rethink the role of the experimenter as that of a helper
assisting novice users with setting up a demanding tech-
nology.
1 Introduction
Usability issues have been regularly cited as a barrier
to the adoption of email encryption [23] since Whit-
‡The study was conducted while the author was at University Col-
lege London (UCL).
ten and Tygar’s seminal paper “Why Johnny Can’t En-
crypt” [24]. The paper received the USENIX Security
Test of Time Award in 2015, which might be interpreted
to mean that this state of affairs persists. Recent re-
search [17] reports that users are increasingly learning
about security threats from various sources, such that
they may be more receptive to adopting email encryption
tools than ever before. There has been increasing effort
to provide end-to-end encryption and eliminate barriers
to adoption, such as key distribution [24, 23, 20, 6].
The motivation behind the study described here was
to observe and analyse novice users’ first encounter with
such tools: 18 years after Johnny, how easy is it to con-
figure and use an encrypted email client?
We know that users prefer to use email encryption
tools which integrate with email systems they are already
using [19]. Thus, we chose to study two current open-
source, integrated PGP email encryption tools – Enig-
mail and Mailvelope. We observed users across three
stages of activity, within a group-based study: an instal-
lation group session, home use over a week with assigned
group communication tasks, and a debrief group session.
Ten participants completed the study, divided into two
groups of four and six participants using Enigmail and
Mailvelope respectively. The approach was validated by
findings showing that barriers were encountered across
all phases of the study for both tools, in many places re-
quiring the assistance of a knowledgeable experimenter
to complete the various stages. This raises questions
about the role of a knowledgeable expert in the process
of learning to use a complex piece of software and over-
coming barriers to effective use, where the experimenter
may need to take on this duty.
2 Background
Lack of usability has been demonstrated to hamper both
the adoption and actual security of email encryption.
Whitten and Tygar [24] explored whether PGP 5.0 could
be used by the general public to effectively secure emails.
The authors employed two evaluation methods: (1) a hy-
brid of a cognitive walk-through and heuristic evaluation,
and (2) a lab-based user study. Problems were identi-
fied in the user interface design which introduced secu-
rity risks – most lab participants were incapable of using
the PGP software securely. It was concluded that mak-
ing security usable requires the development of domain-
specific user interface design principles and techniques.
Garfinkel and Miller [10] performed a user study of
the CoPilot email client and Key Continuity Manage-
ment (KCM), where KCM automates key generation,
key management, and message-signing. The authors
concluded that KCM and CoPilot improved usability by
managing encryption tasks on behalf of users. In con-
trast, Ruoti et al. [20] suggested that designers should
focus on manual encryption to provide transparency and
engender trust in encrypted tools. Subsequent studies
(e.g., [11, 9, 21, 23]) have followed the findings of Whit-
ten and Tygar’s original work, for instance, through stud-
ies of secure communications in two-way radios [7], and
opportunistic email encryption [8].
Recent studies of encryption have explored socio-
technical factors. Gaw et al. [12] interviewed employ-
ees in an organisation, finding alongside usability a range
of social factors influence adoption of encrypted email,
such as the perceived importance of specific messages
and the perceived line between secrecy and paranoia. Re-
naud et al. [18] explored adoption factors across several
dimensions, such as awareness of privacy risks and mo-
tivation to protect against violation of emails. User inter-
views captured mental models of email security, iden-
tifying adoption challenges, such as incomplete threat
models and lack of understanding of email architecture.
Ruoti et al. [19] conducted lab-based studies with pairs
of novices cooperating to send an encrypted email with
a range of email tools, finding that lack of transparency
impacted trust, and that the availability of effective tuto-
rials was critical.
Here, we present a novel approach to studying use
of encrypted email tools – a combination of lab-based
setup with groups of participants using their own com-
puters, home use of encrypted email to perform a shared
task, and debrief in a lab setting to measure perception
of the tools. This allows us to explore where barriers can
emerge during the process of adopting and acclimatising
to encrypted email.
3 Method
Our study aimed to compare characteristics of Enigmail
and Mailvelope, to understand the facilitators and obsta-
cles behind adoption of encrypted email solutions. We
chose Mailvelope and Enigmail as they are end-to-end
encrypted, open-source, and available free of charge.
While Enigmail is a stand-alone extension to the Thun-
derbird email client, Mailvelope is an integrated solution,
as either a Chrome extension or Firefox add-on.
3.1 Design
We conducted a three-part study with one group of par-
ticipants installing and using Enigmail alongside Thun-
derbird, while the other group using Mailvelope. Partici-
pants used their own laptops during the study, as follows:
• Lab-based setup. Participants were interviewed
about their email-related habits, and asked to install,
configure, and begin using their assigned tool.
• Home use of encrypted email. Participants were
given a task to complete outside of the lab set-
ting, organising a mock flash mob campaign via
encrypted email over one week. Participants sent
emails to each other to agree on the location and
music for the mock event, and to confirm the loca-
tion with the experimenter. They also sent emails to
a new member of the group (another researcher).
• Lab-based feedback session. Participants dis-
cussed their experience of Enigmail or Mailvelope.
Participants were asked to bring their own laptops to
the study, to preserve ecological validity [13, 14]. They
were provided with printed copies of the installation
guides for either Thunderbird and Enigmail or Mailve-
lope. Crucially, the experimenter was available to assist
participants – rather than presume to lead them – during
the setup phase, and was contactable during the home-
use phase. Participants were asked to note when they
completed specific tasks on another sheet: (1) installing
Thunderbird (only for the Enigmail group), (2) installing
the Enigmail extension for Thunderbird or the Mailve-
lope extension on Firefox or Chrome, (3) configuring
the extension (generating a private and public key pair),
(4) sharing public keys with other group members, and
(5) sending an encrypted email to the study coordinator.
At the lab-based debrief session, participants com-
pleted System Usability Scale (SUS) [5] forms for both
Enigmail and Mailvelope. The SUS questionnaire con-
sists of ten statements, where users indicate how strongly
they agree with each statement on a five-point Likert
scale. At the end of the final session, participants re-
ceived £30 for their participation.
3.2 Participants
Participants were recruited through a research participant
pool at University College London. It is a participant
pool where members of the general public can register
and sign up for research studies. Prospective participants
completed a pre-screening questionnaire to indicate oc-
cupation, age, gender, whether they had previously used
an email client, and if they had any experience with email
encryption tools.
Overall, 52 individuals completed the pre-screening
questionnaire. Two groups were formed, with six par-
ticipants each, so as to be resilient to unanticipated no-
shows. Those with a background in computer science
were excluded to favour non-technical users. Two of the
invited Enigmail participants did not attend on the day
of the lab-based setup session. The final sample was
as follows: the Enigmail group had four participants,
two females and two males. Their mean age was 32.7
(SD = 20.2, range: 23–45). The Mailvelope group con-
sisted of four females and two males, with a mean age of
39.6 (SD= 9.1, range: 24–76).
3.3 Procedure
Upon arrival, participants were asked to read the infor-
mation sheet and sign a consent form. The first group
was tasked with installing Mozilla Thunderbird and the
encryption extension Enigmail. The second group was
assigned the browser extension Mailvelope that works
with Firefox or Chrome web browsers. An explanation
of the tasks to be completed was given, but users were
not briefed on the specific goal of the study until the end
of the final session one week later.
3.4 Role of the experimenter
We initially conceived the role of the experimenter to
be that of a session facilitator, asking participants about
their experiences with the tools, and eliciting their men-
tal models of how encryption works. As Enigmail and
Mailvelope are targeted towards mainstream users, we
provided participants with official setup guides published
by the developers of the tools.
At the design stage of the study, we did not envisage
the role of the experimenter to be an instructor telling
participants how to set up the tools. However, the pi-
lot session we conducted before the main study sessions
made us change this element of the study design. In
the pilot study, we used a convenience sample consist-
ing of colleagues who mostly had a computer science
background. They were asked to perform the exact same
tasks as our participants. The pilot session of the setup
lab-session took in excess of 1.5 hours, where despite
the sessions being full of discussion about the instruc-
tions, the pilot participants struggled with the installa-
tion process to such a degree that it was necessary for the
experimenter, a domain-knowledge expert, to guide them
through the process to successful installation and use. As
a result, the experimenter was briefed to not actively lead
participants through the setup steps, but to respond to re-
quests for help from participants if they arose during the
session(s).
3.5 Research ethics
The study was conducted after having been approved
by UCL’s Research Ethics Committee (approval number:
9423/001). The research was also registered with the UK
Data Protection Act 1998 (Z6364106/2016/07/11). We
did not collect any personally identifiable information.
We temporarily stored demographics and contact detail
information to be able to select participants and invite
them to the study. This information and the recordings
made during the group sessions were securely disposed
of at the end of the study.
4 Results
4.1 Task completion and times
The average task completion times are shown in Figure 1.
The average completion time for all tasks was 48.1 min-
utes for the Enigmail group, and 40.4 minutes for the
Mailvelope group. Task times are self-reported, so val-
ues may not be precisely accurate, but are indicative of
the time it took for each group to complete the tasks
assigned to them. The majority of participants in both
groups reached and completed the final task. However, it
can be seen that even with (minimal) assistance from the
knowledgeable experimenter it can take novices in the
region of half an hour to set up and test encrypted email.
Average task times for Enigmail are shown alongside no-
table participant quotes in Figure 3, and for Mailvelope
in Figure 4 (see Appendix).
All Enigmail participants completed the four mock
campaign tasks successfully. In the Mailvelope group,
one out of six participants was unable to complete the
third and fourth setup task (e.g., importing a new public
key from a new participant and sending encrypted email
to this person). This participant, P4-M,1 downloaded the
attachment correctly but imported an incomplete block
of text as part of the public key. Participant P2-M was
unable to complete task four due to a broken laptop.
4.1.1 SUS
A SUS score can range from 0 (poor) to 100 (excellent).
The average score for Enigmail was 63.1 (range: 57.5–
77.5, SD = 9.7), and for Mailvelope was 50.8 (range:
1Participants are referred to as PX-E for those in the Enigmail
group, and PX-M in the Mailvelope group.







Figure 1: Task times in minutes for Enigmail and Mailvelope.
27.5–70, SD = 19.4). This result means that Enig-
mail achieved “Good Usability”, whereas Mailvelope
achieved “OK Usability”. An unpaired t-test showed
that these differences were not statistically significant
(p= 0.28), possibly due to a small sample size.
4.2 Qualitative results
The audio-recordings of the sessions were transcribed,
and the transcripts were analysed using thematic analy-
sis [4]. The analysis identified the following themes.
4.2.1 Sharing sensitive information
Participants generally considered personally identifying
information to be sensitive (e.g., when shopping online
or entering passport details for flights). They felt that
disclosure of this information could expose them to the
risk of identity theft or leakage of, for instance, online
banking details.
All participants expressed that they had needed to
share sensitive information at some point. Diverse means
were mentioned; two participants had shared sensitive
information via regular email, a further two via the tele-
phone, and three via messaging applications such as
WhatsApp or Facebook Messenger. Two participants
stressed that they, as users, have to trust the service
provider, or otherwise not use the service at all:
“I mean. . . you basically have to put your trust
in it, otherwise you just don’t use the email
or you don’t use the messenger service, you
know?” (P5-M)
Participants spoke of unintended recipients who might
access their emails. All Mailvelope participants agreed
with P4-M’s sentiment: “Well, I think [. . . ] Gmail,
it’s checked every time we use it and all of our data
is known to them.” Participant P3-M argued that their
emails would not be a target for malicious parties: “We
are not. . . important enough for somebody to hack my
personal email. . . we are not Hillary Clinton!”
4.2.2 Encryption
All participants had previously heard of “encryption”,
but did not report having used a dedicated email encryp-
tion tool. Participant P4-E had, however, previously tried
to install Mailvelope a few months prior to the study:
“I tried to install Mailvelope, yeah, but only
got half-way through ’cause I really couldn’t
understand how to do the rest of it. . . ”
Participant P2-E noted having “seen people use PGP
and stuff” without having used it personally, despite hav-
ing “technical friends” who encrypt their emails. In re-
sponse, P3-M explained the mechanism behind encryp-
tion as follows:
“It kind of converts the entire message into
some kind of codes and then you send to the re-
cipient in the form of code and then something
happens. . . I don’t know what happens. . . ”
There was a consensus amongst participants that en-
cryption did something to the original message that pre-
vented an unintended person from reading the message.
Participants also commented on recent news, airing
concerns about anonymous browsing and government in-
volvement. P1-E commented: “Recently the government
was trying to block. . . something they were trying, they
didn’t want the encryption because obviously they want
access to your emails. . . ” They further elaborated that
using encryption might draw attention: “If all our com-
munications are being monitored, wouldn’t having en-
cryption make you a suspect of some suspicious activity
instead?”
4.2.3 Installation and configuration
Participants from both groups agreed that the installation
of the extensions was straightforward (including Thun-
derbird for the Enigmail group). For P1-M, installing the
Mailvelope extension was perhaps too seamless:
“There was no way of knowing if we had done
it or not. It would have been good if there’d
been a bar across the top saying or showing
how much of it was installed, or saying it was
installed because I wasn’t absolutely sure if it
was finished. . . ”
All participants agreed that configuration of the exten-
sions was complicated. For Enigmail, the experimenter
had to intervene because there was a bug in the setup wiz-
ard. When the setup wizard tried to download the GnuPG
component required by Enigmail to do the cryptographic
work, a progress bar was shown with the progress of this
download. However, the download and installation did
not actually start, and no error message or warning mes-
sage was displayed.
The Mailvelope group complained that after installa-
tion, the steps required to configure the extension were
unclear. They found locating the button to open the op-
tions menu was frustrating since they did not know what
to look for. Participant P2-M commented: “It was a bit
complex, I had to ask many times, it was complicated. . . ”
Enigmail users similarly complained that the process was
convoluted, difficult to follow, and that it was hard to
completely understand all available options, and then de-
cide which one to choose. P4-E elaborated:
“. . . When you get all of the boxes I’m like
“Oh my god! Which one do I do – this one
or this one?” And that’s where I start to strug-
gle because I don’t understand the technical
language.”
All participants completed the steps up until key ex-
change without incident. Those in the Mailvelope group
were frustrated at being unable to share public keys. The
key-generation setup wizard had an option to automati-
cally upload a public key to Mailvelope’s key servers, but
this process did not work – even when the option was se-
lected, the keys were not uploaded. Participants instead
had to copy and paste the key or download it as a file to
manually share it with others.
Experimenter intervention was necessary to explain
the manual process needed to effectively exchange keys.
P4-M was evidently frustrated: “It’s too complicated, it’s
too much!” All participants agreed that this step was the
worst, as it was unclear what to do intuitively or from the
official guide. P5-M: “Finding the keys, importing them,
that was pretty difficult!”. Participants’ mental models
of encryption did not relate the use of two keys:
“I didn’t understand the need for keys, this is
all new to me. . . I can use email, but I don’t
know why we need a key. . . so I would have
given up, I think!” (P1-M)
4.2.4 Thunderbird and Enigmail
The Enigmail group generally did not like the encryp-
tion experience. When asked if any changes would make
the tool better, the focus was on the setup process. P3-E
saw too many steps in the installation and configuration
process:
“I was thinking it should be built into Thunder-
bird, just using one piece of software, so just
basically the install is like: “Where [do] you
want to install it?” and then: “Do you need to
set up keys?” or whatever.”
P4-E made comparisons to the use of other applica-
tions:
“It needs to be literally as easy as installing
some of the other apps, you know, that you can
just download and have encryption that way.”
When considering the design of the Thunderbird inter-
face, P1-E commented that:
“I didn’t really like the interface of Thunder-
bird, I thought it was a little bit more clunky,
umm, it had very old-school interface.”
Participant P4-E said that even though she liked the
idea of encryption, the whole process of getting it to
work was too complicated. She attributed it to her age,
after hearing about encryption, she had genuine privacy
concerns:
“Because it’s there I would use it, but It’s
too complicated, maybe because I’m 45 and
maybe it’s the younger generation of people
who put their whole lives on the Internet,
you know, and privacy, the idea of privacy is
changing. . . and I. . . even though I haven’t got
any sensitive information really, it’s just about
protecting my own privacy. It’s just like get-
ting letters in the post, you wouldn’t neces-
sarily just leave your letters laying around for
people to read. . . ”
P4-E explained usability was necessary for adoption
by all users:
“If I say to some of my friends or even my
elderly parents: “Hey! That’s encrypted e-
mail!”, it’s just not going to happen and it’s
not like I really understand it. It needs to be
literally as easy as installing some of the other
apps, you know, that you can just download
and have encryption that way. For me, it has
to get to that point really for general consump-
tion. . . ”
Participants commented that once the applications had
been configured, the interface in fact simplified the use of
encrypted email as well as public key sharing. They all
noticed the warning messages when an email was going
to be sent unencrypted. They also said that sharing their
public key was easy and convenient because they only
had to click one button.
All those in the Enigmail group did, however, say that
they would likely remove it from their laptops after the
study. P3-E explained:
“I’ll reinstall it if I have specific reasons like
someone sends me an encoded message or
I need to send someone something, but it’s tak-
ing a lot of space.”
4.2.5 Mailvelope
Once through the process of exchanging keys, Mailve-
lope users felt that the rest was easy to do. P3-M and
P2-M commented, respectively, that “I think it was fairly
simple to use after that and yeah!. . . I can see myself us-
ing this with people that I email often. . . ” and that “it
was kind of cool to learn that it was that easy, to be able
to encrypt an email. . . I didn’t realise that you could just
add something to your Gmail. . . you know, an add-on
and do it that easily. . . ”
All participants felt confident using the system after
a few days completing tasks, and wanted to share their
comments. P1-M: “I didn’t know that just adding an ex-
tension you could do all that. . . encrypting and decrypt-
ing. . . ” P6-M struggled to complete tasks for the first
few days of home use, having forgotten the passphrase
for their private key. They were upset about missing the
tasks:
“So I tried all the password permutations, so
I was so confused. . . I still wonder why it is. . .
I used something easy to remember. . . After
several days, I said “Oh my goodness!” I had
to tell you I had forgotten. . . ”
Once asked to repeat the process of generating new
keys, they were excited to exchange the new public key,
where “that was one thing that I managed to do and I
feel quite proud about that!”
There were some comments as to how to improve
Mailvelope’s interface and the process of encrypting
emails. Three participants reported that the button to ac-
tivate encryption was not obvious, leaving them prone to
sending unencrypted email (see Figure 2 for a screenshot
depicting the encryption button). P3-M explained:
“Perhaps something more prominent than just
that tiny button, because I did it a couple of
times, I was writing the text until I realised.”
Figure 2: A screenshot of the user interface for Mailve-
lope displaying the encryption button on the right.
P6-M expressed a concern that the tool did not warn
them when they tried to send their public key, and instead
attached the private key:
“It’s just not safe, I mean, they should def-
initely send a warning message saying “Do
you really want to send your private key. . . ?”
or something. Yeah. . . I sent my private key,
it should at least warn once. There are so
many times when you do something and it’s
like “Are you sure?” and for the private key
it just sends. . . ”
All those in the group agreed that despite interface is-
sues, Mailvelope was easy to use once they were familiar
with the process. Some members of the group mentioned
that they would try to use the tool with friends and fam-
ily. P4-M explained:
“I’ll keep it but to be honest, I doubt I’ll use
it. . . I just don’t email sensitive information
with people. . . that often. . . ”
4.2.6 Interoperability: network effects
In the final session, in both groups when discussing their
possible future use of the tools, participants raised con-
cerns that their contacts would need to install these tools
as well. While it is true that their contacts would need to
install a PGP-based client, the participants in both groups
thought it would need to be the exact same one that they
had. They were surprised when we explained to them
that any PGP-client would be able to exchange encrypted
messages with another PGP-client. It was an interesting
mental model that could have been influenced by mes-
saging applications for smartphones that generally do not
offer interoperability. Research has shown that the adop-
tion of such messaging apps may be influenced by net-
work effects [1].
5 Discussion and conclusions
Participants in both groups were familiar with using
email clients, both in the browser and as standalone ap-
plications. They were also aware of encryption, and had
a basic understanding of what it did to messages, where
learning about security technologies from popular news
is not uncommon [17]. Participants simply reported that
they would not use email to share sensitive information,
having found other ways to share such information that
were felt as being more secure, and voicing a lack of trust
in the medium (in line with studies of pairs of novices us-
ing encryption tools [19]). Both products integrate with
existing solutions. However, Mailvelope integrated with
a browser, permitting users to continue to use existing
email clients that they were familiar with. Where ex-
plicit/visible encryption is seen as necessary, the effort
may lie in paving a way for these features to be inte-
grated into existing popular platforms, and to emphasise
interoperability between tools [2].
Participants used the tools on their own laptops. Inte-
gration with existing applications was highlighted as an
advantage of Mailvelope, although encryption tools were
compared to email clients that participants were familiar
with, such as Gmail. If an encryption tool appears alien,
it compounds the challenge of learning how to operate it
effectively.
Both tools had bugs; downloading the GnuPG compo-
nent required by Enigmail and automatically uploading a
public key to Mailvelope’s key servers did not work. Par-
ticipants had to do both manually after being instructed
by the experimenter. Mailvelope’s option to encrypt
was not immediately obvious as previously shown by
Schochlow et al. [22], where prevention of errors is a fun-
damental precursor to providing usable interfaces [15].
Effective user interaction with encryption tools still lies
in following basic interface design principles, and there
were specific hurdles with each tool.
Ideally, the experimenter has an observatory role in a
study like this, but because of the shortcomings of the
technologies, they had to step out of this role and take
on a more active approach of responding to participants’
questions. Without an informed expert present, many
participants reported that they would not have contin-
ued trying to use the tool(s) in reality. One flaw can
be enough to dissuade potential users. However, with
guidance, the setup was completed for all participants in
both groups. Results suggest that guided habituation of
encryption tools can overcome hurdles in the compre-
hension of encryption. This may be a useful approach
for practical use of encrypted email. However, for secu-
rity user studies, employing researchers who act strictly
as experimenters and without domain knowledge has its
own advantages [14]. Having a knowledgeable expert
close by can be a natural way of learning how to use a
new technology [16], where this study has also been an
opportunity to observe how having a helper available to
provide assistance can overcome obstacles which have a
known – albeit complicated and demanding – solution.
Adoption barriers appeared across all three stages of
our study and for both tools. Practitioners and re-
searchers may continue to study emerging encrypted
email solutions to progressively identify isolated barriers
to adoption. However, security software developers con-
tinue to rely on an intuitive sense of what constitutes us-
ability [3]. If we want any chance of promoting adoption,
basic software quality and usability need to be delivered
first and foremost. Furthermore, developers also need to
draw on usability and design expertise: if the tools are
seen as “retro”, and do not meet user expectations, we
can hardly expect them to be adopted.
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11 min 4.5 min 22.8 min 4.5 min 5.3 min
“It’s too much text!”
(P3-E)
“I don’t like the format of Mozilla Thunderbird. It
looks too. . . I don’t know, Hotmail is a bit better,
and with Thunderbird, it looks like I don’t know,
very retro. . . ” (P2-E)
“Oh, that was easy. . . ”
(P1-E)
“. . . But when you got all of the boxes “Oh my
god! Which one do I do – this one or this one?”
And that’s where I start to struggle because
I don’t understand the technical language. If it
just says: “Do this. Press this.” but once it starts
giving me choices, I’m like: I don’t understand the
differences!” (P4-E)
“If I say to some of my friends or even my elderly par-
ents: “Hey! That’s encrypted e-mail!”, it’s just not going
to happen and it’s not like I really understand it. It needs
to be literally as easy as installing some of the other
apps, you know, that you can just download and have
encryption that way. For me, it has to get to that point
really for general consumption. . . ”(P4-E)
Figure 3: The user journey of setting up Enigmail. The
graph shows timings for each step of the setup process





























3.7 min 18.5 min 17 min 1.2 min
“It was a bit complex, I had to ask many
times, it was complicated. . . ” (P2-M)
“There was no way of knowing if we had done it or not.
It would have been good if there’d been a bar across the
top saying or showing how much of it was installed, or
saying it was installed because I wasn’t absolutely sure if
it was finished. . . ” (P1-M)
“It’s too complicated,
it’s too much!” (P4-
M)
“Finding the keys, importing them,
that was pretty difficult!” (P5-M)
“Yeah, very simple, it was kind of cool to learn that
it was that easy, to be able to encrypt an email. . .
I didn’t realise that you could just add something to your
Gmail. . . you know, an add-on and do it that easily. . . ”
(P2-M)
Figure 4: The user journey of setting up Mailvelope. The
graph shows timings for each step of the setup process
with notable participant quotes.
